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Reading between the Lines: 
Party Cues and SNP Support for Scottish Independence and Brexit 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Ȃȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ U played a prominent role in the 2014 independence 
referendum. The story goes that latent supporters of independence voted to stay within the 
UK to maintain EU access. Defeated, Scottish leaders declared the referendum a once-in-a-
life-time event only repeated if conditions substantially changed. With the UK now facing a 
chaotic exit from the EU, proponents of Scottish independence have suggested that a second 
referendum may occur after Brexit negotiations are completed. Faced with a consensus 
among Scottish party leaders in supporting EU membership, those hoping for a second 
independence referendum, we argue, looked to alternate sources of information that saw 
Brexit as an opportunity to create the conditions that would spur a second referendum. 
Using panel data from the British Election Study, we examine whether Scottish voters voted 
tactically to leave the EU. We argue that SNP voters were likely to interpret statements on 
the conditions for a second independence referendum as an implicit signal to vote ȃȄ. 
The results have important implications for the role of referendums in representative 
democracy, strategic voting, and the importance of intra-party division on individual vote 
choices. 
 
 
Key words: Strategic Voting, Referendums, EU, Brexit, Scottish Independence, Intra-Party 
Disagreement
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Introduction  
Days after the surprise win for the UK campaign to leave the European Union (EU), 
prominent Scottish nationalists began calls for a second Scottish independence referendum. 
Public opinion mirrored these appeals as support for independence surged to new highs (up 
to 59% in one survey).1 This response may be unsurprising as all parties represented in the 
Scottish Parliament converged on a similar position and campaigned to remain in the EU. 
Citizens voted overwhelmingly to stay (62%). Yet, the story is more complex. Despite broad 
convergence of party elites on support for remaining in the EU, tȱȂȱȱȱ
masked internal divisions over policy goals and strategy. For example, Nicola Sturgeon, 
leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), expressed strong support to remain in the EU, 
expounding on its numerous benefits for Scotland. Prominent nationalists, such as former 
SNP leader Gordon Wilson, indicated support for an alternate approach; vote to leave the 
EU to create the conditions for a new independence referendum (Green 2016).2 Further, in a 
televised debate, former SNP leader Alex Salmond projected that if the UK votes to leave the 
EU, a second Scottish independence referendum will occur within two yearsǯȱ Ȃȱ
comment led Willie Rennie, leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrat Party, to comment that 
this could encourage SNP supporters to vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU (Johnson 
2016). ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱsuggested competing motives; she 
had previously linked leaving the EU as grounds for a future independence referendum. 
Faced with competing messages from prominent elites within parties that introduced 
opposing policy goals, supporters of an independent Scotland faced a choice between a 
sincere vote to stay in the EU, and an instrumental vote for an uncertain independence 
referendum. High levels of aggregate support for the ȃRemainȄ camp may have masked the 
prevalence of instrumental voting.3 Indeed, areas such as Glasgow that voted in favour of 
                                                          
1 See CurticeȂȱ ǻŘŖŗŜǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ This discussion 
implies that the real increase was smaller, but did increase to majority support for Scottish 
independence.  
2 Importantly, 	ȱȂȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  (see Green 2016), 
adding to the mixed cues sent by prominent party leaders. We thank a reviewer for drawing our 
attention to these reactions.  
3 We use a number of phrases particular to the campaigns.  ȃȄȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱ
electoral campaigns in support of remaining within the EU or leaving the EU since these were the 
slogans and names endorsed by the campaigns. We also use these terms to refer to the vote itself. We 
refer tȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ¡Ȅȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
process.  
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Scottish independence in 2014 faced lower turnout than more Unionist cities (despite 
Unionists actually being more likely to support the leave campaign in pre-referendum 
polls).4 Strategic voting, thus, may be more prevalent than the aggregate indicators alone 
predict.  
We argue that many in favour of an independent Scotland demonstrated support for 
independence by voting to leave the EU. Further, we posit, based on the logic of strategic 
voting and elite signalling, that in the face of competing messages from non-partisan elites, 
those in support of Scottish independence, who also supported the SNP, chose to go against 
the ¢Ȃ dominant message and voted to leave the EU. For these voters, the parallel 
argument on the conditions required for a second independence referendum acted as an 
implicit cue ȱȱȱȂȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
in the EU.  
We test the argument using panel data from the third and eighth waves of the British 
Election Study in Scotland. In particular, we connecȱȂȱȱȱȱ
in the 2014 referendum to their self-reported behaviour in the 2016 EU referendum. We find 
that supporters of Scottish independence were more likely to vote in favour of the UK 
remaining in the EU; however, they were also more likely to pursue alternate voting 
strategies, depending on their identification with the SNP. 
The theory and results have important implications for the role of referendums in 
representative democracy.  From a theoretical standpoint, this study suggests that voters do 
not approach referendums in a vacuum. Rather, referendum vote choices may be influenced 
by choices in previous or expected future referendums. Further, this study addresses the 
role that strategic voting can play, and the role party politics, specifically intra-party 
division, has in influencing vote choices. Although public discourse often celebrates 
referendums ȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¡ȱȱ, as well as other 
political conditions, may create opportunities for tactical considerations. The expectation of 
future referendums on alternate, but connected, ¢ȱȱ ȱȂȱ ȱ ȱ
the simple binary decision expected by many advocates of direct democracy to a more 
complicated multi-dimensional problem. By considering the multi-dimensional 
                                                          
4 For example, the district encompassing Glasgow city centre achieved a voter turnout of 
approximately 56.3% in the EU referendum in contrast with 73% turnout in the Edinburgh city centre 
district (The Electoral Commission, 2016). 
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consequences of their vote choice, this perspective creates the opportunity for tactical voting 
in referendums. Forward looking, tactical voters may vote to set the future agenda, rather 
than express their sincere preferences on future participation within the EU, which in this 
specific case may be a second referendum on Scottish independence. These results suggest 
that popularly elected leaders should think twice before using referendums to avoid or meet 
political aims on important issues, as the effect of elite cues may be limited. 
 
Referendums and Voting Behaviour 
 
Studies suggest that voters act in similar ways in referendums as they do in other 
contexts. A growing area of research considers the relationship between referendums and 
election campaigns (see, for example, Uleri and Gallagher 2016). Although referendums are 
a distinct subset of elections, studies find that demographic and attitudinal considerations 
influence voters in referendums similar to their impact in decision-making processes in 
other contexts. For example, national identity matters in votes on devolution and EU 
referendums in a range of settings such as Wales (Jones and Scully 2012), the Czech Republic 
(Hanley 2007), and the Baltic States (Mikkel and Pridham 2004).  
Not all studies of direct democracy focus solely on demographic, attitudinal, 
economic or structural indicators, however. Past research on referendums in the EU, for 
example, shows that support for the outcome depends on the popularity of the sitting 
governmental parties (Franklin et al. 1995). Markowski and Tucker (2005) illustrate evidence 
of individual level strategic behaviour in Poland. They find that many opposed to joining 
the EU sought to invalidate the 2003 referendum by not turning out to vote. In particular, 
voters tried to deny the 50% mandatory threshold rather than turnout out to vote against 
joining the EU.  
Citizen information about referendums likely also matters. De Vreese and Semetko 
(2004), for example, show that the media played a role in the 2000 EU referendum in 
ǯȱ £Ȃ vote choice responded to exposure to public television campaign 
advertisements. In a number of EU referendums, Hobolt (2005), moreover, finds that more 
informed voters rely less on elite cues. In the Irish case, Marsh (2015) finds evidence that 
party cues, incumbency and issues play an important role in vote choice.  
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Although referendums seem to offer relatively simple, distinct alternatives at face 
ǰȱȂȱ-making calculi may be more complex. Referendums can disrupt or 
limit the usefulness of the normal set of cues and heuristics voters us to make informed 
decisions (see also Quinlan 2012). In the Scottish referendum, for example, the SNP acted as 
the primary advocate of an independent Scotland, whereas the other major parties largely 
advocated remaining in the UK. Conversely, the EU referendum placed all major parties in 
Scotland on the same footing according to their official positions, advocating to remain in 
the EU. This policy convergence created a context that amplified the role played by intra-
party dissent among current and former party elites. While no Scottish party leaders 
advocated the Leave position, the lack of policy disagreement among the major parties likely 
created an opportunity for a wider (and potentially less traditional) range of voices. Indeed, 
Scottish voters may have perceived goals for independence and a vote to remain in the EU at 
odds. Whereas voters in England and Wales likely voted Leave for sincere policy reasons; 
voters in Scotland might have voted Leave for tactical reasons.   
 
Voter Coordination and Tactical Voting 
 
 Electoral rules induce strategic voting behaviour. Under single member districts in a 
unidimensional setting, for example, voters may select a candidate other than their most 
preferred, but who has a higher chance of winning the election to reduce the chance that an 
even less preferred candidate wins (Downs 1957). Tactical voting occurs in a range of 
systems, including those with open and closed list proportional representation and mixed 
member rules (e.g. Gschwend 2007). 
In the context of a referendum, a tactical vote would entail a choice to support the 
less preferred outcome because the voter hopes that her vote will lead to a new status quo 
supporting a third potential outcome. From the perspective of a tactical voter, a vote to leave 
the EU, might have created the dissatisfaction within Scotland (where hypothetically over 
60% of voters supported independence because of their desire to remain in the EU) to hold a 
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new, more successful referendum.5 Although this perspective requires a number of 
assumptions of what would happen following a Leave vote, past referendums on the EU 
suggest that voters acted tactically or instrumentally in these settings (Markowski and 
Tucker 2005).  
Importantly, voters supporting Scottish independence would not have had to 
develop this logic on their own. Although far from the official position of the party, 
prominent members of the SNP, such as Nicola Sturgeon, ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
Ȅȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ. In 
fact, former Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond, stated, unequivocally, in a nationally 
televised debate regarding Brexit, that a vote to leave the UK could lead to a second Scottish 
independence referendum within two years (Johnson 2016).  Some media, moreover, 
discussed the merits of a tactical vote in the run up to the referendum (e.g. Green 2016). 
Voters who prioritized Scottish independence had the signals and logic presented to them. 
Indeed, as evidence from the Irish case suggests (e.g. Quinlan 2012), the cross-party 
agreement on support for EU membership likely further encouraged voters to consider other 
cues in their voting decision. A vote for Leave could be construed as support for a second 
Scottish independence referendum. Following this logic, those who voted for Scottish 
independence in 2014 would likely be those who would prefer a second independence 
referendum. Therefore, we would expect that these individuals would be more likely to vote 
in favour of Brexit to shift the status quo and spur a new Scottish independence referendum, 
which is our first hypothesis.   
 
H1: Voters who supported Scottish independence are more likely to vote to leave the EU. 
 
Partisan Identification and Mixed Signals 
Strategic behaviour requires that voters not only hold information about current vote 
choices and how fellow citizens will likely act, but also about the implications of that choice 
(Meffert and Gschwend 2010). Lago (2008), for example, shows that citizens in Spain use 
past election results as a heuristic to predict future coalition participation. Voters might also 
                                                          
5 Public support for a second independence referendum soared in the weeks following the EU vote 
(see Curtice 2016). The initial bump was, however, short lived. An August poll carried out by YouGov 
found support for a second referendum declined to 46% (https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/09/01/). 
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ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ
(Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Spoon and Klüver 2017). Past electoral behaviour is less 
useful in referendums, however, as levels of information available to voters depend on the 
salience and intensity of campaigns (Hobolt 2005). 
Theories of democracy propose that parties serve as a linkage between voters and 
government (Lawson 1980, 2005; Dalton et al. 2011). One major function of parties is to 
mobilize voters and to serve as a heuristic or cue on the ballot when it comes time to vote 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Parties can, moreover, be thought of as brands, each with a 
distinct ȃproductȄ to offer (Downs 1957; Aldrich 1995; Cox 1997; Lupu 2013). By providing 
voters with a heuristic or cue to follow, parties can reduce the cost or burden of voting to the 
individual. In many cases, parties also provide direct information about how to vote 
tactically under specific electoral rules (Gschwend 2007).     
The ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ  
emerges from party policy convergence, intra-party dissent, and conflicting priorities. 
Despite convergence, Ȃ statements can still inform voters about how they should vote. 
Indeed, a substantial body of research emphasizes partisanship and party campaigns as 
tools for elite messaging and as a form of voter heuristic. Research specific to referendums 
suggests that elite messages are integral in influencing vote choices (Darcy and Laver 1990; 
Siune et al. 1994; Quinlan 2012). For example, Darcy and Laver (1990) find that the campaign 
opposed to the passage of a constitutional amendment to allow for divorce in a 1986 Irish 
referendum created doubts in the minds of voters, and led to an unexpected vote against the 
measure. Additionally, Siune et al. (1994) and Quinlan (2012) show that elite campaigns had 
a significant impact on voteȂ choices in the 1993 Danish referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty, and the 2008 Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.6 
 ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
messages on voter behavior. From the perspective of an electorally motivated leader, a party 
would position itself to maximize its potential votes (Adams 1999; Spoon 2011) which would 
be broad enough to allow voters to project their own goals on the party (Shepsle 1972; 
Somer-Topcu 2015), and would emphasize the issues that encourage an image of 
                                                          
6 Importantly, Quinlan (2012) does not focus on the role of parties.  His findings that the campaign 
matters in determining vote choice in referendums, however, suggests that in those countries in 
which parties do become involved in the campaign, their messages will matter. 
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competence (Petrocik 1996; Green and Jennings 2011a; Hobolt and de Vries 2012; Greene 
2015). Importantly, these strategies require a somewhat unrealistic assumption that party 
leaders, MPs and members express a consistent message. 
Contrary to this assumption, groups within parties hold and often express diverse 
preferences. Ceron (2012; 2013; 2014), for example, shows that intra-party factions in Italian 
parties diverge in non-ȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
to an election. The distribution of preferences within French and German parties, moreover, 
increases when they are in government and the party expects to be punished by voters for 
the economy (Greene and Haber 2014). Parties with parliamentary delegations from diverse 
ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ	ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ŘŖŗŜǼȱ d their MPs 
address a greater range of issues in parliament (B¡ck et al. 2014). Evidence of disagreement 
within Scottish parties, therefore, is not unique. Party leaders, MPs and members hold a 
distribution of preferences over a diversity of issues and dimensions. 
ǰȱ Ȃȱ ȱ  often the result of intra-party decision-making and 
compromise. Spoon and Williams (2017), for example, find that intra-party division 
conditions ȂȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱos, moreover, 
likely respond to shifts in voter preferences when party leaders are less constrained by their 
activists (Schumacher et al. 2013). Public perceptions of intra-party division hold real 
consequences for parties, as voters consider them less competent and are less likely to vote 
for them (e.g. Greene and Haber 2015). 
Despite mixed messages from parties and elites, evidence suggests that voters use 
symbols such as partisan identification to make decisions about politics. Informational 
shortcuts such as partisan labels can be useful in a range of settings (Lupia 1994; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998). Yet, voters may rely on overly broad heuristics in complex informational 
environments (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Parties divided on an issue, and signalling mixed 
messages, likely complicate the use of overly simple heuristics. Voters may hear competing 
messages:  the official (explicit) message of the party and a more subtle, even hidden 
(implicit) message from party elites.7 Evidence suggests that in the case of mixed or 
                                                          
7 This outcome is different than when the party system is highly divided or polarized.  Levendusky 
(2010), for example, has shown that when elites are more polarized, cues from the party can be 
clearer.  Voters are better able to identify the Ȃȱ positions and their policy views are more 
consistent with their issue preferences.  
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conflicting signals, their effectiveness decreases. Indeed, in the case of relatively basic cues 
such as partisanship and gender, voters are more likely to hold incorrect beliefs about their 
¢Ȃȱȱwhen they conflict (Pyeatt and Yanus 2016).   
In addition, when parties present a divided or disunited message, research suggests 
ȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱ as their message is weakened. Voters are less 
likely to perceive parties as competent on issues or vote for those parties when they also 
perceive them as divided (Greene and Haber 2015). Factors such as the economy greatly 
ȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ǻ	ȱȱȱŘŖŗŗǰȱŘŖŗŗǼǯȱ
Moreover, voters likel¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱ
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
campaigns when they are ideologically close (van der Brug 2004; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; 
Vegetti 2014).  Thus, when voters are faced with competing messages over how to achieve 
distinct policies on issues they are likely to agree with, and act on, the signals that most 
readily correspond with their position on the most important of these policy dimensions are 
the ones they will likely follow.    
 This discussion has implications for the Brexit vote. Elite messages and campaigns 
can influence Ȃ choices in referendums (Darcy and Laver 1990; Siune et al. 1994; 
Quinlan 2012). Despite the major Ȃȱ official positions supporting Remain, the EU 
referendum presented voters with the opportunity to question and subsequently deviate 
from the official positions (see Darcy and Laver (1990) for a discussion of the effects of a lack 
of a clear elite message on referendum voting decision). Messages from prominent 
supporters of the SNP acted as a distinct signal from some SNP elites that a vote in favour of 
Brexit could lead to a second Scottish independence vote, and provided a strong impetus for 
SNP supporters to vote in favour of Brexit. This effect was particularly strong among those 
who were most in favour of a second Scottish independence referendum. Indeed, those in 
support of an independent Scotland could easily reinterpret statements of support to 
Remain in the EU as the responsible and necessary positions for the party in government, 
while simultaneously justifying their decision to vote Leave with ȱȂȱȱȱ
towards Westminster of a second referendum outcome if the UK voted to leave the EU. 
Faced with competing signals, this was likely a challenging decision to these voters, as their 
immediate goals conflicted with an uncertain potential to meet their more important long-
10 
 
term goals. The difficulty of this choice along with the reduced usefulness of party labels 
likely limited the scope of this outcome while also incentivizing tactical behaviour. 
Following this logic, we expect that supporters of the SNP, who also favour a second 
Scottish independence referendum, would be more inclined to tactically vote in favour of 
Brexit in the hopes of altering the status quo to spur a second Scottish independence 
referendum. While in our first hypothesis, we perhaps have an overly simple expectation 
that all supporters of Scottish Independence voted tactically, in our second hypothesis, we 
narrow the scope of the prediction to those most likely to perceive competing messages from 
party leaders: SNP supporters.  
 
H2:  Voters who supported Scottish independence and identify with the SNP are more likely 
to vote to leave the EU. 
 
In summary, we hypothesize that supporters of Scottish independence voted 
instrumentally in the EU referendum, voting in favour of Brexit in order to change the status 
quo and bring about a second Scottish independence referendum. Further, we posit that, 
because of division among the official SNP position regarding Brexit and the signals some 
SNP elites sent regarding the possibility of a second Scottish independence referendum if 
Leave won, this effect should be particularly strong among those who favour Scottish 
independence and support the SNP. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
To test the above hypotheses, we use panel data from the British Election Study 
(BES) Internet Panel, focusing only on those respondents who had the right to vote in the 
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. The data used in this study comes from either 
Wave 3, which was conducted immediately following the Scottish independence 
referendum in September 2014, and Wave 8, which was conducted immediately preceding 
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the Brexit vote in 2016. The BES panel study has the benefit of covering the same 
Ȃȱȱȱ the Scottish independence and the EU referendums.8 
ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ -reported intention to vote in favour of the United Kingdom 
leaving the EU in June of 2016 as the dependent variable. To operationalize this variable, we 
rely on the BES Panel Study Wave 8 ǰȱ ȃȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǯȄȱWe coded those 
 ȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȃȱȱȄȱȱ1, while those who responded 
ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȱȱȄȱ ȱȱ0. We exclude from the analysis those 
who reported that they would not vote, or did not know. This results in a mean value of 0.37 
and a standard deviation of 0.48 for the full sample of Scottish respondents.9 
The main independent variable used in testing H1 is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether an individual voted for or against Scottish independence in the 2014 
referendum. We operationalize this variable using BES Panel Study Wave 3 data based on 
ȱǰȱȃȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǵȄȱȱ ȱ
coded as a 1 if they voted for Scottish independence, and 0 if they voted against Scottish 
independence. We omit those who did not vote in the Scottish independence referendum or 
did not know how they voted referendum. This variable has a mean of 0.47, with a standard 
deviation of 0.50 in the full sample.10 
To test H2, we create an interaction between a respondentȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Scottish independence referendum and whether an individual identifies with the SNP. 
Support for the SNP was operationalized as a dummy variable based on the BES Wave 8 
question, ȃ	¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ
ǰȱȱ ǵȄȱThose who answered this question with a response of SNP were coded 
with a value of 1. All others were coded as 0. This variable has a mean of 0.14 with a 
                                                          
8 The internet panel was implemented as an online survey by YouGov from February 2014 to 
December 2016. For additional information about the survey, see the Appendix or Fieldhouse et al. 
(2016). 
9 In the BES Scottish sample, 63% supported Remain; whereas, 62% of Scottish voters actually voted to 
Remain on June 23, 2016 indicating that the Wave 8 data provides a fairly representative measure of 
Brexit referendum vote choice. 
10 We used Wave 3 data as respondents were more likely to remember exactly how they voted in the 
Scottish independence referendum when asked soon after casting a ballot rather than years later. In 
the sample, 47% of Scots recalled voting for independence, whereas 45% of Scots voted for 
independence on September 18, 2014. This suggests that the Wave 3 data provides a fairly 
representative measure of Scottish independence referendum vote choice. 
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standard deviation of 0.34. The interaction variable (vote for Scottish 
independence*identification with the SNP) ranges from 0 to 1, with a mean of 0.15 and a 
standard deviation of 0.36. 
We also include a number of control variables. First, we include traditional vote 
choice indicators as control variables: age cohort, education, gender, marital status, and 
personal income.11 Second, we also incorporate variables measuring EU efficacy and EU 
political knowledge.  Our EU efficacy variable is based on the BES Panel Wave 8 question, 
ȃ
 ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǵȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǯȄȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱśȱǰȱȃ¢ ǰȄȱȃǰȄȱȃȱȱȱ
ǰȄȱȃǰȄȱȱȃ¢ȱǯȄȱȱ ȱ ȱȃȂȱ Ȅȱ ȱ¡ȱ
from the analysis. The variable has a mean of 3.77 and a standard deviation of 0.89 in the full 
sample. Our EU political knowledge variable is an additive variable derived from a battery 
ȱ¡ȱǻŜǼȱȃȱȱȄȱȱȱȱEU in the BES Panel Wave 8. The variable has a 
mean of 1.42, with a standard deviation of 1.91 in the full sample.12 Our final control variable 
focusȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ  clarity of the campaign material they received 
during the EU referendum campaign. We create a logged scale of campaign clarity from the 
two measures of campaign information included in Wave 8 of the BES panel. This variable 
equals the natural log of the difference between the amount of campaign information 
respondents report having received from the Leave and Remain campaigns.13 This measure 
                                                          
11
 See the Appendix for the questions used to measure these variables.  
12 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ǰȱ ȃȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǲȄȱ ȃ £ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱǲȄȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȄȱȃȱȱȱore on agriculture than any 
ȱ¢ȱǲȄȱȃȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǲȄȱ
ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ dȱ ȱ ȱ ŗśȱ ȱ ǯȄȱ ȱ f a respondent answered a question 
correctly s/he was given 1 point for a maximum of 6 possible points.  
13 The scale is based on the difference between responses to the two campaign information variables 
ȱȱȱȃȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǵȄȱȃȱleave 
campaign has provided clear information about why we would be better off leaving the European 
ǯȄȱ ȃȱ remain campaign has provided clear information about why we would be better off 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȄȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ śȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȃ¢ȱȄȱȱȃ¢ȱȄǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
by 5 so that they range from 0 to 1 and then subtract the values. We then calculated the natural log of 
the items (plus 1).  ܥ݈ܽݎ݅ݐݕ݈ܵܿܽ݁ ൌ ሺ⁡? ൅ܮ݁ܽݒ݁ܥ݈ܽݎ݅ݐݕ⁡? െ ܴ݁݉ܽ݅݊ܥ݈ܽݎ݅ݐݕ⁡? ሻ 
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allows us to control for the relative clarity of information provided by the campaigns in a 
single measure. Higher values indicate that the respondent perceived the Leave campaign as 
having a clearer campaign than the Remain campaign. On average, respondents reported 
the Remain campaign as slightly clearer with a mean value of -0.04 and a standard deviation 
of 0.26 in the full sample. For descriptive statistics, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
 As our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression (Long 1997). 
Additionally, we use robust standard errors to estimate our models. 
 
Analysis 
 
Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that those who voted in favour of Scottish 
independence in 2014 were more inclined than those who voted against independence to 
vote in favour of Brexit.  Model 1 presents the results of a logistic regression testing this 
hypothesis. In contrast to our expectation, ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŗŚȱ ȱ
independence referendum is statistically significant and negative. This indicates that if an 
individual voted in favour of Scottish independence in 2014, she was more inclined to vote 
in favour of the United Kingdom remaining in the EU.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We show the predicted differences in the likelihood of voting to Leave in Figure 1. 
As the coefficient indicates, the likelihood of voting for Brexit is actually lower for those 
respondents who reported voting for Scottish independence. Those supporting Scottish 
independence have a lower probability of voting Leave of approximately 0.05 in comparison 
to those not voting for independence.14 In the face of broad party consensus, it appears that 
the average supporter for independence was actually more likely to use party cues to 
support remaining in the EU (e.g. Lupia 1994; McCubbins and Lupia 1998; Quinlan 2012).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
14 Despite the overlap in the confidence intervals in the predicted likelihoods presented in Figure 1, 
the effect is statistically different at the 95% level in Model 1.  
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Model 2 adds a dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual supports the 
SNP. When the SNP variable is included, the effect of the Scottish independence vote 
variable remains negative, but becomes statistically insignificant. Additionally, the SNP 
dummy variable is negative but also statistically insignificant. This suggests that the main 
finding of Model 1, that a vote for Scottish independence in 2014 is associated with a vote for 
the UK to remain in the EU, is not robust. It further suggests that identifying with the SNP 
has important effects that may condition the effect of voting for Scottish independence. 
Model 3 presents the results of a test of H2 that SNP supporters who voted for 
Scottish independence were more likely to vote in favour of the United Kingdom leaving the 
EU. The interaction between a Ȃ identification with the SNP and her vote in the 
Scottish independence referendum, is positive (the expected direction) and statistically 
significant. This indicates that those who identify with the SNP and who voted for Scottish 
independence were more likely to vote for the UK to leave the EU.15 
To explore the substantive impact of voting ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
choice in the Brexit referendum when she identifies with the SNP, we computed a predicted 
effects plot based on Model 3 (holding independent variables at mean or median values for 
dichotomous variables). As in Figure 1, the y-axis of Figure 2 shows the predicted likelihood 
of voting for the UK to leave the EU, the x-axis indicates whether an individual voted for 
Scottish independence or not. Those who support the SNP and voted against Scottish 
independence have a likelihood of voting for Brexit of roughly 0.075. At the same time, those 
SNP supporters who voted for Scottish independence have a likelihood of voting for Brexit 
of about 0.20. That is to say, among SNP supporters, those who voted for Scottish 
independence were nearly three times as likely to vote for Brexit as those who voted against 
Scottish independence on average. These results are consistent with a story in which at least 
some voters with a strong preference on a second dimension of conflict seek alternative 
signals in the case of elite preference convergence (Darcy and Laver 1990; Siune et al. 1994; 
Quinlan 2012). 
                                                          
15 In Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix, we replicate Model 1 by the Ȃȱ ¢ȱ
ȱǻȱǯŘǼȱȱȱřȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ
for Scottish independence. Although the main English parties were divided, our results suggest their 
Scottish counterparts were not as overtly divided on the question of whether to leave the EU.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Several of our control variables also confirm our expectations and reach standard 
levels of statistical significance. We find that age, education level, and perceived campaign 
clarity, to be statistically significant in all three models. The coefficient for age is positive, 
indicating that older voters were more likely to vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU. 
Education, conversely, has a negative relationship with voting for Brexit; those with more 
education were less likely to vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU. The coefficient for the 
campaign clarity scale is positive; those who saw the Leave campaign as having a clearer 
message were more inclined to vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU, and vice versa. 
Since the average perception of campaign clarity is negative, this suggests that the Remain 
camp actually benefited in aggregate from their campaign information. Additionally, 
efficacy was statistically significant and positive in both Models 1 and 2, suggesting that 
those who felt that they had a better grasp of the issues at stake in the Brexit referendum 
were more likely to vote in favour of leaving the EU.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have sought to understand the role of tactical voting in 
referendums by exploring the relationship between the Scottish independence and Brexit 
referendums. We hypothesized that voters use elite signals (even in a context of elite 
preference convergence) to negotiate a tricky choice: support the short-term goal (remain in 
the EU) or vote for a less desired outcome (leave the EU) with the intention of setting up the 
conditions for a second referendum on Scottish Independence. By linking the outcome of 
one referendum to the potential for a future vote, a simple unidimensional question was 
turned into a multidimensional problem. Signals such as the prominent statement from the 
Scottish First Minister made clear that a new independence referendum would only occur 
following a ȃmaterial changeȄ in support for Scottish independence.16 This, in turn, created 
                                                          
16 Given the prominence of the EU in the Scottish independence referendum, those in support of 
independence easily could have believed that Brexit would bring about these conditions. Sturgeon 
commented on the need for ȱȃȱȄ during a debate between Scottish party leaders held 
on April 6 by STV in the run up to the 2016 Holyrood elections (BBC, April 8, 2016). This statement 
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the opportunity for a tactical vote.  Following this logic, we posited that those who favour 
Scottish independence from the United Kingdom would vote tactically by voting to Leave 
the EU. We further argued that this effect would be particularly strong among those who 
favour Scottish independence and support the SNP, as they received mixed messages from 
ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ. ¢ǰȱ ȱȂȱȱȱ is 
the goal of Scottish independence, and its supporters could easily understand this from any 
of their statements.  
Using panel data from the BES, we find that voters who favour Scottish 
independence at the time of the independence referendum were generally more inclined to 
vote against Brexit; however, those who favour Scottish independence and identify with the 
SNP were more inclined to vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU. These findings are 
consistent with a story in which some pro-independence SNP supporters behaved as if they 
were voting tactically for a new Scottish referendum.  
On a practical level, these results hold important implications for politics in Scotland, 
the UK and the EU. They suggest that the Scottish vote totals may have under-predicted 
support to remain in the EU. Further, although we only find evidence that a small 
percentage of SNP voters choose this route, these results suggest that we are better able to 
predict reported vote intentions for nearly two percent of the sample once accounting for the 
tactical voting argument.17 Projected to the UK level, this change in votes could have tipped 
the balance in support for remaining in the EU.  
Our results also have implications for our understanding of voter behaviour in 
general and the role of party division in determining voter behaviour, more specifically. 
First, these results demonstrate that, when provided with uncertain long term incentives, 
some voters diverge from their short term preferences and vote instrumentally. As most 
Scottish voters maintain a preference and affinity for the EU, these results suggest that many 
Scots chose to vote in favour of Brexit, ignoring their preference to stay in the EU, with the 
hope of achieving their long-term goal of independence through a second Scottish 
referendum. This result adds further nuance to a theory of the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ arlier position requiring that polls consistently show over 60% support for 
independence (The Scotsman, October 18, 2015).   
17 A model without the dummy variables for reported vote in the Scottish independence referendum 
and identifying with the SNP correctly predicts approximately 77.5% of the EU vote intentions, 
whereas our fully specified model improves the accuracy rate to 79.2%. 
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European integration and regional nationalism in Europe (e.g. Jolly 2015). Second, our 
results show that intra-party division plays a large role in influencing vote choice. While 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ȃ preferences, intra-party division 
limits ȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȂȱ
votes. Furthermore, the salience of major issues, such as Scottish independence, to voters 
likely determines their willingness to deviate frȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǯ Ultimately, 
referendums can create the opportunity for tactical voting depending on the potential 
outcome of the proposed policy change.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Vote Choice in the EU Referendum 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ind. Ref. Vote -0.266** -0.146 -0.359** 
 (0.114) (0.142) (0.157) 
SNP Identification . -0.20 -1.610 
  (0.155) (0.451) 
Ind. Ref. Vote* . . 1.657*** 
SNP Identification   (0.481) 
Age Group 0.148*** 0.153*** 0.155*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Education -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.070*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Gender 0.038 0.035 0.039 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Marital Status -0.039 -0.044 -0.053 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) 
Personal Income -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
EU Efficacy 0.123* 0.124* 0.111 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) 
EU Political Knowledge -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Campaign Info. Scale 5.985*** 5.987*** 6.003*** 
 (0.522) (0.522) (0.523) 
Constant -0.710 -0.700 -0.585 
 (0.451) (0.450) (0.588) 
    
AIC 1810.984 1811.445 1800.863 
BIC 1866.771 1872.810 1867.807 
“W2 198.280 201.550 202.540 
Log-Likelihood -895.492 -894.722 -888.431 
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 
 
.789 .791 .792 
Observations 1956 1956 1956 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  We present the results of logistic regression 
models in Table 1 predicting the likelihood that a respondent reports voting for 
Brexit with Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Likelihood of Voting In Favour of Brexit for Full Sample (Model 1)18 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Likelihood of Voting In Favour of Brexit for SNP Identifiers (Model 3) 
 
                                                          
18 Predicted likelihoods in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are estimated from 1000 draws of the variance-
covariance matrix based on the results presented in Model 1 and 3, respectively. Independent 
variables are held at their mean values for continuous variables and at the median values for 
dichotomous variables. The predicted probabilities are the median predicted value with 90% (lighter 
lines) and 95% (darker lines) confidence intervals.  
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